Abstract High quality accounting information is an important source and basis for macro-economic development and micro enterprise decision-making. Taking the national industrial policy with Chinese characteristics as the starting point and using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2019 as the research samples, this paper empirically tests the influence mechanism of industrial policy on corporate earnings management and the moderating effect of analyst coverage. The results show that industrial policy can reduce corporate financing constraints, improve corporate investment efficiency, increase corporate market expectations and attract the news media’s coverage, which can inhibit corporate earnings management. Meanwhile, compared with accrual earnings management, industrial policy has a stronger inhibitory effect on real earnings management. The moderating effect test finds that analyst coverage can speed up the effective and accurate transmission of industrial policy information, reduce the motivation of earnings management, and thus strengthen the inhibitory effect of industrial policy on corporate earnings management. The conclusion provides new empirical evidence for revealing the incentive effect of industrial policy on corporate accounting information quality and the information amplifier function of securities analysts. At the same time, it can be used for reference to optimize the formulation and implementation of industrial policies, guide analysts’ information transmission and value discovery.