Fault-tolerance Construction, Responsible Incentive and Corporate Innovation
ZHAO Ling1, HUANG Hao2
1. School of Economics, Xihua University, Chengdu 610039, China; 2. School of Taxation and Public Finance, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, China
Abstract Based on the quasi-natural experimental scenario of “implementation method of fault tolerance and error correction mechanism” issued by large state-owned enterprise groups, this paper empirically examines the impact of failure-tolerance exemption on state-owned enterprises' willingness to innovate.The results of the double difference model show that the implementation of fault-tolerant exemption system significantly improves the level of R & D investment of state-owned enterprises and stimulates the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in innovation.After a series of robustness tests, this conclusion is still valid. Further cross-sectional analysis shows that the above promotion effect is more obvious when senior executives have a higher chance of political promotion, have work experience in open coastal cities and face greater economic policy uncertainty. Further research shows that the failure-tolerant and error correction mechanism can improve the innovation level of enterprises, and make them obtain significant positive market performance. The results expand and enrich the relevant literature in the field of enterprise innovation behavior and science and technology evaluation, and explore the mechanism that the change of trial and error tolerance environment affects executive's willingness to innovate. And it provides a reference for the follow-up research on the relationship between performance evaluation and state-owned enterprise innovation, and provides empirical evidence and theoretical reference for policy-making departments to promote the construction of trial and error-tolerant systems and norms.
2022, Vol. 39 
