Abstract Based on the data of 455 Chinese commercial banks from 2009 to 2019, this paper empirically tests the influence of deposit insurance limit and bank government background on their risk-taking and its synergistic effect. The results show that there is a U-shaped relationship between deposit insurance limit and bank risk-taking. The deposit insurance limit and the bank government background not only have an impact on the bank risk taking, but also weaken the restraint effect of the market mechanism, thus weakening the U-shaped relationship between the bank risk taking and the deposit insurance limit. The higher the household savings rate is, the smaller the net interest margin is, and the more obvious the influence of bank-government background on weakening the U-shaped relationship between deposit insurance limit and bank risk-taking is. Based on the fact that China’s deposit insurance system is in its initial stage, this paper provided important policy implications for giving full play to the role of deposit insurance limits and the background of the bank government, and strengthening the effective management of bank risk-taking.