Abstract Based on the data of listed companies from 2008 to 2017, this paper systematically explores the influence mechanism of home-country political connections on OFDI of Chinese enterprises from the perspective of home-country and host-country effects, and examines the joint regulatory role of ownership and the relationship between government and market. There are following empirical results: (1) The home-country political connection is significantly negatively correlated with OFDI of enterprises. (2) Compared with private enterprises, the home-country political connection has more negative impact on state-owned enterprises’ OFDI. (3) With the improvement of the positive role of the market in the allocation of resources, the impact of home-country political connection on the enterprises’ OFDI changes from “incentive” to “restriction”. (4) The joint moderation effects show that the moderation effects of the ownership on home-country political connection and enterprises’ OFDI depends on the relationship between the government and the market. Under the regulation of the relationship between the government and the market, the difference of the impact of home-country political relations on the OFDI of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises is reduced. (5) The results of Mlogit model show that the home country effect is prominent when the developing country is the host country, and the host country effect is also prominent when the developed country is the home-country, regardless of whether or not the regulation effect is considered. (6) Rent-seeking cost plays an intermediary role between home-country political connections and corporate OFDI. The conclusion has much reference value for Chinese enterprises to make a balance between home-country political connection and OFDI.