Abstract Chinese equity incentive regulations require the listed companies set vesting restrictions and installment unlock arrangement, which are the characteristics of vesting restrictions. This paper studies the effect of vesting restrictions on corporate earnings forecast strategy under the internal and external governance environment based on the annual data of A share listed firms from 2010—2018. The research evidence shows that Long-term equity can significantly improve the formal precision and essential truth, and the information decision usefulness is enhanced, however the impact of Short-term equity is not significant, and it may reduce the information quality. Further tests show that, the effect of vesting restrictions depends on the internal and external governance environment; Long-term equity can improve the information quality under the conditions of low ownership concentration, low institutional investors’ shareholding, high market level and high law level, and Short-term equity effect is not statistically significant; Under the low law level, both Long-term and Short-term equity can improve the essential truth, and Short-term equity has greater incentive effect. These results may enrich the relevant research, and provide some new empirical evidence on the influence of executive incentive on corporate information disclosure behavior.
2020, Vol. 37 
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