The Influence of Rent-Seeking Competition on Enterprise Performance——The Prisoner’s Dilemma of Enterprise Rent-Seeking
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Abstract This paper uses the data of China’s listed companies from 2000 to 2017 and focuses on the impact of rent-seeking competition on enterprise performance, and draws the following conclusions. The rent-seeking behavior of enterprise itself can promote enterprise performance, while rent-seeking competition among enterprises not only significantly inhibits enterprise performance, but also plays a moderating effect and makes the profits of enterprise’s rent-seeking activities decline through the internal mechanism of seizing government resources, increasing tax burden, and reducing the innovation level of enterprises. The paper further finds that the impact of rent-seeking competition on enterprise performance is heterogeneous, non-state-owned enterprises and small enterprises’performance are more seriously inhibited by rent-seeking competition. The findings of this paper show that rent-seeking competition among enterprises is a vicious circle of prisoner’s dilemma, and can be effectively restrained only by establishing a fair and transparent market competition mechanism.
LIU Feiran,HU Lijun. The Influence of Rent-Seeking Competition on Enterprise Performance——The Prisoner’s Dilemma of Enterprise Rent-Seeking. Economic Survey, 2020, 37(2): 0125.
2020, Vol. 37 
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