Abstract:
This dissertation compares the influence on economic structure caused by the local government with the target of maximize the local economic output under the fiscal centralization institution, complete fiscal centralization institution and partial fiscal decentralization institution. It is found that under the information symmetry conditions, the fiscal centralization and complete fiscal decentralization are equivalent. However, under the partial fiscal decentralization institutions, the local government are effort to develop the revenue-generating industry, which results to loss of efficiency, bringing the regional economic structure change. These results provide a theoretical support to understand the rapid development construction industry and urbanization, and also provide evidence to the recent fiscal decentralization reform.
Keywords:
收稿日期 2016-11-02;
接受日期 2016-11-02;
作者简介: 张芬(1985-),女,山西吕梁人,博士(后),主要从事地方政府行为等研究。
引用本文:
张芬.地方政府行为、财政分权与区域经济结构[J]. 经济经纬, 2016,5: 132-136
ZHANG Fen.Local Government Behavior, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Structure[J] Economic Survey, 2016,V33(5): 132-136