“Adverse Selection” Problem of Industrial Injury Insurance: the Inner Logic and Empirical Analysis
WANG Zeng-wen1, 2
(1.School of Public Administration, Nanjing University of Finances and Economics, Nanjing 210046, China；2.Research Center of Employment and Social Security, Nanjing University of Finances and Economics, Nanjing 210046, China)
Abstract：
The empirical study of the paper shows that it is vital to set up incentive mechanism by the rate combination of industrial injury insurance premium difference against the game theory between government and enterprises in order to provide solution for the current problem of adverse selection of industrial injury in China.
WANG Zeng-wen.“Adverse Selection” Problem of Industrial Injury Insurance: the Inner Logic and Empirical Analysis[J] Economic Survey, 2013,V1(2): 144-149
2013 
