债务契约冲突：投资过度或不足——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据

摘要过度投资和投资不足是企业债权人与股东财务冲突最常见的两种类型。笔者以2004年~2006年中国制造业上市公司为样本实证研究发现，中国企业债权人与股东之间的财务冲突既具有一般性又具有特殊性。一般性在于债权冲突类型与企业投资项目的风险水平相关。而特殊性主要表现在冲突类型与企业所有权性质相关：即相对国有控股上市公司，民营控股上市公司存在投资不足的债权冲突；相对民营控股上市公司，国有控股上市公司长期债务存在过度投资的债权冲突。

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	雷新途

关键词：债权冲突投资过度投资不足

Abstract： Overinvestment and underinvestment are the two common types of financial conflicts between enterprise creditors and stockholders. The author took the listed companies in Chinese manufacturing industry from 2004 to 2006 as samples and made an empirical research. The research shows that the financial conflicts between enterprise creditors and stockholders have the general traits and their specific characteristics. The general traits lie in that the types of creditor's right conflict are related to the risk level of enterprise' investment projects. The specific characteristics are shown in that the types of conflicts are related to the nature of enterprise ownership. Compared with state-controlled listed companies, private listed companies have the creditor's right conflict of underinvestment; the creditor's right conflict of overinvestment exists in the long-term debt of state-controlled listed companies compared with private listed companies.

Keywords： creditor’s right conflict overinvestment underinvestment

收稿日期 2011-02-10; 接受日期 ; 网刊发表日期 2011-09-25

基金资助:

中国博士后科学基金项目（20110491373）；浙江省自科基金项目（ Y6110082）；浙江省社科基金项目（10CGGL06YB）。

作者简介: 雷新途（1972—），男，浙江温州人，南京大学工商管理博士后流动站博士后，主要从事财务冲突与监控问题研究。

引用本文:

雷新途.债务契约冲突：投资过度或不足——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J]. 经济经纬, 2011,5: 123-128

LEI Xin-tu.Debt Contract Conflicts :Overinvestment or Underinvestment——Evidence from the Listed Companies of Chinese Manufacturing Industry[J] Economic Survey, 2011,V28(5): 123-128

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2011/V28/I5/123