Abstract：
In order to explore relationship between current fiscal transfer payment system and local government’s implicit debt behavior, this paper uses provincial panel data from 2006 to 2017 and builds PVAR model to make analysis of the dynamical relationship between transfer payment policy and implicit debt of local government in the national, eastern, central and western regions. The study finds that the transfer payment policy still helps local government to relieve the implicit debt, especially in the western regions. In the eastern regions, there is no obvious relationship between implicit debt and transfer payment. In the central regions, transfer payment can alleviate the demand of debt caused by the gap between income and expenditure in the short term. But in the long run, it may bring about the “common pool” effect. Therefore, the transfer payment system can be used to regulate the implicit debt behavior of local governments. On the basis of the relationship between transfer payment and implicit debt of local governments, the transfer payment system in different regions should be established, which helps to relieve the risk of local government implicit debt effectively.
FAN Yuxiang, GUAN Zhihua.Transfer Payment Path of Relieving Local Government’sImplicit Debt RiskAn Empirical Analysis Based on PVAR Model[J] Economic Survey, 2020,V37(6): 163-176
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