高管权力、股权激励与隐性腐败

摘要针对高管权力与隐性腐败关系问题,选择2011—2015年沪深A股上市公司样本,实证分析了高管权力对隐性腐败的影响及股权激励对两者关系的调节作用。研究发现,高管权力对隐性腐败有显著的正向影响。股权激励能有效调节高管权力与隐性腐败的关系。进一步研究显示,国有企业高管权力对隐性腐败的影响更为明显,非国有企业股权激励能更好地调节高管权力与隐性腐败的关系。

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	黄国良
	丁月婷
	吴汉英

关键词：高管权力隐性腐败股权激励

Abstract： This paper empirically analyzes the influence of executive power on implicit corruption and the moderating effect of equity incentive on the relationship between them by processing the data of A-listed companies at Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during 2011-2015. The results show that executive power is significantly correlated with implicit corruption and the equity incentive can effectively suppress the implicit corruption. Further studies show that the relationship between executive power and implicit corruption is more obvious in SOEs, and the effect of equity incentive is more significant in Non-SOEs.

Keywords： Executive Power Implicit Corruption Equity Incentive

收稿日期 2017-05-11; 接受日期 2017-05-11;

基金资助:教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(15YJC630176);江苏高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2016sjd630081)

作者简介: 黄国良(1968— ),男,浙江临海人,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要从事财务理论与方法研究;丁月婷(1989— ),女,江苏盐城人,硕士研究生,主要从事财务理论与方法研究;吴汉英(1992— ),女,江苏徐州人,硕士研究生,主要从事财务理论与方法研究。

引用本文:

黄国良,丁月婷,吴汉英.高管权力、股权激励与隐性腐败[J]. 经济经纬, 2017,3: 105-110

HUANG Guo-liang, DING Yue-ting, WU Han-ying.Executive Power, Equity Incentive and Implicit Corruption[J] Economic Survey, 2017,V34(3): 105-110

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2017/V34/I3/105